Damning debt report from parliament


It is not certain which is more damning: the report of the CPI on the US$2-billion secret debt, or the evidence given to it by high level witnesses defending themselves – notably former president Armando Guebuza, former finance minister Manuel Chang, and António Carlos do Rosário, the senior official of the intelligence and security service (Serviço de Informação e Segurança do Estado, SISE) who is head of the three companies, Ematum, Proindicus, and MAM.

Guebuza and do Rosário both stressed that the main purpose of the loans was military and security, and not fishing. They mainly cited issues around coastal protection, relating to piracy, the gas industry, fishing, immigration and smuggling. Guebuza also cited Renamo and other unidentified security threats, particularly electronic.

Under a still secret Integrated Monitoring and Protection System for the Exclusive Economic Zone (Sistema Integrado de Monitoria e de Protecção da Zona Económica Exclusiva em Moçambique) set up in 2013, the three companies were created as “special purpose vehicles” that were owned by government (mainly SISE) but could act independently of it. Proindicus was set up first (January 2013, US$622-million loan) to establish “integrated systems of aerial, spatial, maritime, lake, river and terrestrial security”. Then Ematum was set up for coastal protection and tuna fishing, and finally MAM for shipyards.

Chang and do Rosário both confirmed that the idea was that Proindicus would borrow US$2-billion; then when that was not possible, two other companies were set up with fishing as the front.

Only at the last minute did it become obvious that loans would require State guarantees. Do Rosário said he knew the guarantees would be illegal, but appealed to Chang’s sense of patriotism. Chang confirmed he came under pressure from SISE and agreed to the guarantees without telling the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), the Banco de Moçambique, the Attorney-General’s office or the IMF. He then made convoluted arguments that he
had that right to decide, and that a debt guarantee was not the same as debt because it was not included in the budget because it was not expected to have to be paid by the government.

The CPI rejected Chang’s arguments. Article 179 of the Constitution is explicit that: “parliament establishes the upper limit for guarantees that may be given by the State”. In 2013 the upper limit was only US$5-million. The Commission report says that the loans “constitute a violation of the Constitution and of budget laws” which put limits on what a Finance Minister can do. It went on to say that in signing a guarantee, the government” renounced its sovereignty, submitting itself to the sovereignty of the British court system” and relinquished its sovereign immunity.

Chang admitted that: “for us, the funding applications were very urgent. Unfortunately, we did not have any notion that we might be abdicating our sovereignty”.

Chang also argued that it was for the lenders (Credit Suisse and VTB) to tell the IMF about the loans, not the government. In any case “the IMF representation in Maputo is an office only. It is not an institution that discusses policies with the government. Those who discuss policies with governments are the IMF’s missions” to Mozambique (which are led by a more senior official).

Again, the Commission rejected Chang’s comments. The government has a “duty” to inform that IMF and, even if it had not done so early, it should have told the mission to Mozambique in 2015. Failing to do so “compromised all the agreements reached” in 2015, including a US$283million loan.

Intentional secrecy:

Do Rosário said that the entire package was intended to be secret, “Of course we could not go and tell either the banks or anyone else that fishing was not the main part; that it was not for us the initial objective, but only complementary”. Indeed, it was against the instructions of the Mozambicans that the financier of the Ematum operation, Credit Suisse, decided to launch a public bond issue. “Then the soup was spilled, and after that we had to manage things”.

Activities were moved to the other two companies and the loans to them were kept secret. Guebuza justified the secrecy on the grounds that the whole issue was “strategic-military” and that purchases were being made using “classified information” from SISE.

Do Rosário argued that that once an agreement had been reached with the Lebanese company Privinvest, he did not want any more public discussion, which would have led to an “open war” with other companies making offers.

The Commission was not impressed. It said the relations between the three companies, the contractor and the creditors (the banks) were far too close and “were not transparent”. The report said the government ought to have brought in an independent inspecting body to check whether the assets ordered by Ematum, Proindicus and MAM had been delivered.

Bad contract:

All of the money from the loans was apparently directly transferred to the contractor Abu Dhabi Mar, owned by the Lebanese company Privinvest. Nothing was held back, “which broke the golden rule of the world of business”, and ignored totally the need to cover local costs for management, staff, training, bureaucratic procedures and initial debt repayments. And the Commission was highly critical of “the financial projections [which] were made on the basis of unsustainable and hypothetical assumptions”. In the viability studies “there was apparently no effort to take into account the risks inherent to the country’s situation, such as its vulnerability to international commodity prices”.

Call for further investigation, but protecting those responsible, do Rosário refused to give the CPI information on how the funds had been transferred and used. The Commission complains that parliament did not give it enough money to fund its own investigations – it received US$70,000, only one-third of what it asked for. Thus, it recommends further investigations of exactly what the three loans were used for. And it calls for investigation into “any signs of illicit use of public funds by private individuals or companies during the contracting of the debts and issuing of guarantees”.

Nevertheless, despite the Commission saying the loan guarantees are illegal and unconstitutional, it advises parliament not to renounce the debt, in order to protect those responsible from legal action. Renouncing the debt would be saying that those who offered the state guarantees acted in bad faith, and Article 227 of the civil code says that anyone who signs a contract in bad faith is responsible for the damages caused to the other party.

Would do it again:

On 28 November, Guebuza told the Commission that the whole process was correct and he would do it again: “Under these conditions, I believe any responsible government would act as we did. And if we were in the same conditions and had to make the same decisions, considering the circumstances at that moment, we would do exactly the same thing today, in defense of the beloved homeland and the wonderful Mozambican people”. Guebuza also lectured the Commission on his role in the armed struggle, “abandoning” his family and being jailed on his way to fight, eventually reaching Frelimo in Tanzania. He then stressed how “proud” he was of what he had done as president. The implication was that mere members of parliament had no right to question him.

Do Rosário also claimed success. “First is to do, and only later explain how we did it. Then at least there’s no way around it. And it looks like it worked. Perhaps we will be blamed for doing what we did. But we did it deliberately, with the objective of serving the state. And we succeeded”.

Secret but leaky:

The Commission took evidence in secret, its report is secret, and the report was debated by parliament in secret on Friday 9 December. But details have been widely published in the independent press and by the state news agency Agencia de Informacao de Moçambique, although not by the state-owned daily Notícias.

Comment: renounce the debt?

Should Mozambique refuse to pay the US$2-billion secret debt? The CPI report takes a middle position. It says the debt should be paid by the three companies and not the government, that the government guarantees are invalid, and that the debt could be declared null and

void by parliament. But it says parliament should not do that, on three grounds. First, it would be an admission that the government acted in bad faith, which could bring legal action against the government and individuals under the civil code. Second, that the Mozambican “State would lose confidence at the international level”. Third, any decision on the debt will be taken by a British court. The guarantees given as part of the loan include that British courts have “exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any disputes arising out of or in connection with this warranty”, and that the Mozambican State renounces “any immunity which it or its property or income may enjoy in any jurisdiction”.

Joseph Hanlon was policy officer Jubilee 2000, the campaign to cancel developing country debt, 18 years ago (and which campaigned for Mozambique’s eventual HIPC debt cancellation). Based on that experience, Hanlon would make totally the opposite case. Precisely because the issue will be resolved by a British court, the Mozambican parliament should refuse to authorize the guarantees – at least on the MAM and Proindicus debt. (Ematum has been rescheduled as Mozambique government bonds, so the position there is different).

For MAM and Proindicus, the loan was provided in secret by Credit Suisse and the Russian State-owned bank VTB, who then broke the loan into pieces which it sold to investors saying it was State guaranteed debt for a profitable fishing project. Due diligence would have shown all three claims to be false – the constitution did not allow the State guarantee, the two companies could never be profitable, and it was for arms. Therefore, the loans were improper and should never have been made in the first place, and were sold on to investors under false premises. Thus, a British court could decide that the liability is with Credit Suisse and VTB, and not Mozambique.

If Mozambique does not pay, or pays only small amounts, it is accepting liability for the debt and simply defaulting. But if it says the debt is improper and it renounces the debt and says the government has no liability, then it is for a British court to decide if Credit Suisse and VTB, or Mozambique, are liable.

Source: Mozambique News Reports and Clippings

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